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Abstract
This paper studies the welfare properties of competitive equilibria in an economy
with incomplete markets subject to idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. We focus
on the role of securitization, whereby borrowers can reduce idiosyncratic asset risk,
which enables increased leverage and investment. In the absence of frictions in the
securitization process, we show that the ability to securitize assets completes markets.
When there are frictions in the market for securitized assets, requiring originators to
hold some skin-in-the-game, markets remain incomplete and risk-sharing is limited. In
this case, fire-sales are required to repay debt and finance new investments when the
economy is hit by a negative shock. Moreover, the equilibrium may be constrained
inefficient due to the existence of a pecuniary externality that can result in over or
under-investment. We examine policies to correct over-investment and find that a
leverage ratio restriction generates a Pareto improvement, while forcing originators to
hold additional skin-in-the-game reduces welfare. Both policies reduce leverage and
raise prices in a fire-sale, however tightening skin-in-the-game also directly reduces the
resources available to those who most need them, which dominates the positive effect
of higher prices.
JEL codes: D52, D53, E44, G18, G23.
Keywords: Securitization, pecuniary externalities, collateral constraints, financial frictions,
macroprudential regulation, fire-sales, incomplete markets.
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1 Introduction
The tremendous growth in securitization over the last several decades has significantly
altered global capital markets and the nature of financial intermediation. With the rise
of the originate-to-distribute model, U.S. asset backed securities outstanding have grown
from approximately $11.3 billion in 1986 to over $2,150 billion in 2010.1 Despite the size
and importance of this transformation, there is relatively little theoretical analysis on the
aggregate and welfare implications of securitization. This paper attempts to fill this gap.
In an economy with financial frictions, securitization may be valuable because it can
enhance risk-sharing opportunities by substituting for missing markets. Specifically, when
asset returns are subject to idiosyncratic risk and markets for hedging such risk are limited
or nonexistent, pooling assets via securitization provides additional insurance. As a result,
securitization can raise aggregate investment and leverage as borrowers are able to issue safer
liabilities to risk-averse lenders. However, as has been shown in the literature, competitive
equilibria may exhibit socially excessive aggregate investment when markets are incomplete.2
Thus, while securitization enhances risk-sharing it may amplify over-investment, and as such
the welfare implications of securitization may be ambiguous.3
To analyze the welfare implications of securitization we develop a dynamic general equi-
librium model of investment and securitization with incomplete markets. When securitiza-
tion is an imperfect substitute for missing markets, such that risk-sharing is limited by a
“skin-in-the-game” constraint on sellers forcing them to retain a certain fraction of their own
investments, we show that competitive equilibria may be characterized by socially excessive
investment and leverage. In this case, a planner facing the same constraints as the private
market can engineer a Pareto improvement by reducing financial sector leverage. The im-
provement arises from an increase in the price of assets in the event of a fire-sale, which
1These figures are taken from Table 1 in Gorton and Metrick (2012). For a summary of the growth of
securitization markets, as well as a discussion of many of the relevant issues see Gorton and Metrick (2012)
and Segoviano, Jones, Lindner, and Blankheim (2015).
2For example, see Lorenzoni (2008).
3Generally, additional markets need not increase welfare, as first shown in Hart (1975).
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transfers resources to individuals that have the most productive use for them. Surprisingly,
requiring sellers to hold more skin-in-the-game, which also reduces leverage (indirectly) and
raises prices in a fire-sale, is always welfare reducing.
The paper develops a three-period model of investment. In period 0, risk-neutral bor-
rowers with limited capital, who we refer to as intermediaries, obtain funds from risk-averse
investors to finance investment projects. Investments are either successful early (period 1),
successful late (period 2), or fail late and return nothing. While ex-ante homogeneous, in-
termediaries differ at period 1 as returns on their individual investments may arrive early
or late. Those with early returns (early types) will have sufficient funds to meet their debt
obligations and to invest in new opportunities that arrive in period 1. Intermediaries that
do not have early returns (late types) will be required to raise funds. Importantly, financial
frictions rule out state-contingent contracts at period 0 and borrowing at period 1. As a
result, late types will sell assets to early types via a spot market to generate funds to service
debt and invest in new opportunities. However, late types may be constrained in their abil-
ity to raise funds, forgoing positive NPV investments and creating a “credit crunch.” The
extent to which late borrowers are constrained is dependent on the prevailing asset price,
which in turn depends on the aggregate funds early types have and the aggregate quantity
of assets for sale. Crucially, atomistic intermediaries do not anticipate the impact of their
period 0 investment and securitization decisions on the price of assets at period 1. Therefore,
a pecuniary externality arises that can result in period 0 investment that is either insufficient
or excessive from a social perspective.
In our model, securitization mitigates financial frictions by moving funds from early to
late types at period 1, substituting for contingent contracts that would provide such transfers.
This allows intermediaries to create more safe debt for risk-averse investors by increasing
pledgeable income when returns are late. In other words, demand for securitization is driven
by the need for high-quality collateral required to borrow from risk-averse investors. This is
a standard partial equilibrium view of how more securitization can lead to increased leverage
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and investment.4 However, our framework also highlights a novel aspect of securitization;
that securitization affects spot market prices by changing the distribution of cash in the
market. Specifically, with more securitization at period 0, demand for assets at time 1
declines since the funds of early types are reduced. On the supply side, late types require
less funds and have more assets to sell. This results in a reduction in the price of assets at
period 1, creating a transfer from late to early types and thereby amplifying the pecuniary
externality.
Our framework allows us to shed new light on the welfare implications of policies to curb
excessive leverage in the financial sector. We show that investment is generally inefficient
when securitization is not complete and that leverage restrictions, akin to those outlined
in Basel III, can be welfare improving when the competitive equilibrium is characterized
by too much investment. However, implementing leverage restrictions presents a number of
practical difficulties due to asymmetric information between intermediaries and regulators.5
Alternatively, it seems plausible that recent policies designed to restrict the extent of
securitization in the financial system could also increase welfare, since securitization affects
leverage indirectly. For example, the retention requirements in the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act and
the European Capital Requirements Directive.6 Indirect policies such as these are important
from a practical perspective because they require significantly less information than direct
restrictions on the balance sheet, such as capital or leverage constraints.7 Perhaps more
importantly, market restrictions on skin-in-the-game could influence the leverage of non-
regulated institutions, since securitized lending is at the heart of so-called “shadow banking.”
We show that the total effect of forcing more skin-in-the-game can be decomposed into
4See for example DeMarzo (2005), Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009), Gorton and Metrick (2012), and
Kiff and Kisser (2014).
5For example, differences in the accounting treatment of derivatives (GAAP versus IFRS) imply very
different levels of leverage for large banks.
6Specifically Article 122a of the European Capital Requirements Directive and Section 941 of the U.S.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act both require a five percent minimum retention
rate by securitizers or originators, with exceptions for various types of underlying assets. Notably, “qualified”
residential mortgage backed securities, which are backed by loans that meet a specific underwriting criteria.
7In a general framework with pecuniary externalities, Kilenthong and Townsend (2016) consider how to
implement constrained-efficient outcomes via alternative market-based mechanisms.
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a direct effect and a price effect. There is a direct tightening of the constraints on late
intermediaries, which reduces the collateral value of investments, causing them to reduce
leverage ex-ante. On the other hand, reduced aggregate investment increases the price of
assets in a fire-sale, which increases the collateral value of assets and results in increased
leverage. The direct effect is obvious and provides an intuitive rationale for tightening
constraints as a means to reduce excessive investment. However, this is undone by the price
effect, leaving the negative impact of the tighter constraint to dominate. This makes clear
that the rationale for policies to increase skin-in-the-game as a means to reduce excessive
leverage cannot rely solely on partial equilibrium arguments.
For our results to obtain we require market incompleteness coupled with frictions in the
securitization process. The missing markets we assume are a precondition for securitized
lending, since the existence of contingent securities at period 0 or frictionless borrowing at
period 1 eliminates the value in securitizing assets in our model. While we are agnostic
about the specific market failure(s) that result in borrowing constraints, the literature has
highlighted a number of possibilities. For example, limits to borrowing may be justified by
the presence of asymmetric information as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), limited commitment
following Kehoe and Levine (1993), or moral hazard as in Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1997). The
assumption that issuers of securitized assets may be forced to hold some skin-in-the-game
is also vital. The reasons for this are not modeled in the paper, but can be motivated by
the existence of an informational asymmetry between originators of securities and outsiders.
This type of argument is made formal in DeMarzo and Duffie (1999), who find that issuers
holding skin-in-the-game is an optimal contractual arrangement in the presence of issuer
private information. This can arise in other interpretations, such as Holmstro¨m and Tirole
(1997), where this type of structure arises to address moral hazard.8 This assumption can
also be supported by new regulations (discussed above) that force issuers of securitized assets
8Cerasi and Rochet (2014) provide a model of securitization of this type in which banks hold an equity
tranche to maintain proper incentives. However, when the initial investment need not be raised in conjunction
with securitization, the skin-in-the game requirement need not be part of the optimal contract as shown by
Hartman-Glaser, Piskorski, and Tchistyi (2012).
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to retain economic exposure in an effort to ensure their interests align with investors.
Related Literature
This paper is related to the study of pecuniary externalities which arise from incomplete
markets. This literature goes back to the seminal work of Hart (1975), Diamond (1980),
Stiglitz (1982), Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) and Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986).
In our application, market incompleteness precludes individuals from equalizing marginal
returns to investment. This is similar to the type of friction studied in Shleifer and Vishny
(1992), Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001), Allen and Gale
(2004), Lorenzoni (2008), Farhi, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2009), Davila, Hong, Krusell, and
Rios-Rull (2012), He and Kondor (forthcoming) and Mirza and Stephens (2016), among
others.9 This paper shows how pecuniary externalities may result in inefficient investment
when the securitization process is plagued by frictions. Thus, we link the literature on
investment with incomplete markets and asset securitization. This allows us to study welfare
and examine policies in a well-understood framework.
Our model of securitization is an extension of the framework developed in Gennaioli,
Shleifer, and Vishny (2013). In their setting, securitization is socially worthwhile as it
can completely remove idiosyncratic risk from financial intermediaries’ assets. This permits
the financial sector to become more leveraged and invest more.10 This is inefficient when
agents are not rational and cannot assess the risks in securitized assets correctly. In our
paper, market incompleteness limits the ability of intermediaries to insure themselves against
idiosyncratic asset risk. Furthermore, aggregate investment is excessive due to a coordination
failure only when markets are incomplete, which results in inefficient fire-sales even when all
agents have rational expectations.
9Krishnamurthy (2010) and Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013) survey the literature on aggregate impli-
cations of financial frictions. Davila (2015) provides a discussion of several key papers in this literature,
including the impact of various modeling assumptions on welfare analysis. In his terminology, we model a
“terms-of-trade” externality.
10Diamond (1984) first showed risk-pooling by financial intermediaries can increase investment and welfare.
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There is a growing literature on securitization, which for the most part focuses on security
design and the contractual features arising from asymmetric information cost. For example,
DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) and DeMarzo (2005) examine security design problems in static
settings whereas Hartman-Glaser et al. (2012) focus on a dynamic problem.11 Hanson and
Sunderam (2013) consider a security design problem incorporating endogenous information
acquisition by investors. Shleifer and Vishny (2010) develop a novel model of securitization
where intermediaries sell assets to maximize fee revenue from intermediation. In contrast,
this paper focuses on the general equilibrium impacts of securitized lending and the associ-
ated welfare implications. Gale and Gottardi (2015) also examine the impact of pecuniary
externalities on ex-ante capital structure of intermediaries. Debt is preferable to equity in
their model due to tax advantages, and they identify the impact of fire-sales by bankrupt
firms on the ex-ante capital structure. Our paper differs in that we abstract from tax advan-
tages of debt and the possibility of default in equilibrium while also examining the impact of
a credit crunch following a fire-sale. Toda (2015) also considers a general equilibrium model
of securitization, but abstracts from the pecuniary externalities that are the main focus of
this paper.
2 Model
We adapt the model of securitization from Gennaioli et al. (2013). There are three
periods; t = 0, 1, 2. There are two principal actors; risk-neutral intermediaries (borrowers)
and risk-averse investors (savers). We describe each further below.
2.1 Intermediaries
The economy is populated by a measure one of risk-neutral intermediaries, indexed by
j, that have access to risky investment projects at both t = 0, and t = 1 that either succeed
11See Gorton and Metrick (2012) for an excellent summary of the literature and an extended discussion
of the relevant issues and outstanding questions.
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or fail. Undertaking investment is costly with intermediaries incurring non-pecuniary costs
c(I) for investing I units. We assume that c(·) is an increasing and convex function with
with c(0) = c′(0) = 0. We interpret these as the effort costs required to find and maintain
quality investments.
Each intermediary has access to risky investment opportunities at t = 0 with returns
subject to both idiosyncratic and aggregate risk. Investments can either succeed, in which
case gross returns per unit of investment are R0, or fail and return nothing. Moreover, t = 0
investments may succeed early, at t = 1, or late, at t = 2, while failure is only learned
late. The probability of success is identical and independent across intermediaries. The
probability of success, pi(ω), varies with the aggregate state ω ∈ Ω ≡ {g, b, r} realized at
t = 2. The state g captures a “good” or “growth” state where all intermediaries’ projects
succeed, b captures a “bad” state where a number of projects fail, while r captures an even
less productive “recession” state such that pi(g) = 1 > pi(b) > pi(r) = l > 0. We denote
the probability that state ω is realized by φ(ω), and define φ(g) = p, φ(b) = (1 − p)q,
φ(r) = (1− p)(1− q), where p, q ∈ (0, 1).
At t = 1, a fraction σ ∈ Σ ≡ {h, l} of t = 0 projects succeed. We assume σ is publicly
observable and provides an informative signal about the realization of the aggregate state ω
at t = 2. The signal h (high) is observed with probability p and conveys that the aggregate
state at t = 2 is good (g) with certainty. Alternatively, with probability 1 − p the signal l
(low) is observed and it conveys that the aggregate state may be either bad (b) or a recession
(r).12 For simplicity, we assume that if the high signal is observed, all investment projects
succeed early (h = 1), while if the low signal is observed, only a fraction l < 1 of projects
succeed early. After observing early investment returns, intermediaries form beliefs over late
returns. Denote the probability that projects succeed late, conditional on the realization of
signal σ by pi(ω|σ). Then, pi(g|h) = 1 as all projects succeed in the good state, pi(r|l) = 0
12Formally, denote by φ(ω|σ) the probability that the state at t = 2 is ω, conditional on the signal σ being
observed. We assume φ(g|h) = 1, φ(g|l) = 0, φ(b|h) = 0, φ(b|l) = q, φ(r|h) = 0, φ(r|l) = 1 − q. To ensure
that signals convey the appropriate information so that φ(ω|σ) 6= φ(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω, σ ∈ Σ, we impose
h > pi(b) and l ≤ pi(r).
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since only l projects succeed in the recession state, and pi(b|l) = pi(b)−pi(r) = pi(b)− l > 0.13
Importantly, investments that do not succeed early following the low signal are less likely
to ever succeed; i.e., conditional on σ = l, expected returns of late assets are lower. Thus,
while we ignore the possibility of projects failing at time 1, this is consistent with our model
and failure of assets at t = 1 could be included in the analysis in a straightforward way. We
write gross returns on period 0 investments for each intermediary as follows:
Eω (pi(ω))R0 = φ(g)pi(g|h)R0 + φ(b) [l + (1− l)pi(b|l)]R0 + φ(r) [l + (1− l)pi(r|l)]R0. (1)
We assume throughout that investment at t = 0 is worthwhile:
ASSUMPTION 1. For any investment level I ≥ 0, Eω (pi(ω))R0I − c(I) > I.
Intermediaries also have access to new risky investment opportunities at t = 1, which
provide returns at t = 2. The gross return on one unit of investment is R1 in the case
of success and zero otherwise. The probability of success is qh when σ = h, and ql when
σ = l, where we qh > ql. This captures the intuitive case in which new opportunities are
of higher quality when the high signal is observed. For simplicity, the probability of success
is perfectly correlated across intermediaries, and independent of the aggregate state ω at
t = 2. These assumptions permits us to ignore the possibility of pooling t = 1 assets and
focus solely on the impact of securitizing t = 0 investments. As a further simplification,
we let the non-pecuniary costs associated with investment to be zero when σ = h. We also
assume that t = 1 projects are always worthwhile.
ASSUMPTION 2. For any investment level I ≥ 0, qhR1I > qlR1I − c(I) > I.
Intermediaries’ Problem
At t = 0, each intermediary invests I0,j, and holds reserves y0,j, using capital wint and
funds raised from investors. To raise funds, intermediaries issue risk-less debt claims Dj at
13Note that pi(g|l) = pi(b|h) = pi(r|l) = 0 as φ(g|l) = φ(b|h) = φ(r|h) = 0.
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t = 0, that promise a return ρ at t = 2. Additional funds for investment can be raised by
selling the cash flows associated with S0,j ≤ (1− a)I0,j units of investment, where a ∈ [0, 1)
is the “skin-in-the-game” required by originating intermediaries. As discussed in Section
1, skin-in-the-game requirements can arise from informational frictions in the securitization
process and/or regulatory requirements. For simplicity, we take these as given. Interme-
diaries may also purchase cash flows T0,j from other intermediaries. We interpret T0,j as
the cash-flows derived from a pool of all other intermediaries’ assets. Although an inter-
mediary’s own projects have the same expected payoffs as cash-flows purchased from the
pool, due to diversification the latter bear no idiosyncratic risk, only aggregate risk. This is
important because this diversification allows intermediaries to increase pledgable cash-flows
to debt holders when intermediaries have late returns. In other words, the cash-flows from
the pool of assets T0,j, provide better collateral than the cash-flows from the intermediary’s
own investment I0,j.
We interpret sales and purchases of cash-flows by intermediaries as securitization. For
simplicity we do not model “tranching”, nor do we distinguish between originating inter-
mediaries, sponsoring intermediaries and “special-purpose vehicles” (SPV). We view equity
as a junior tranche, which is held by the intermediary, while the senior tranche is sold to
investors as (completely) safe debt.14
The decisions of intermediaries at t = 1 consist of investing in new opportunities, pur-
chasing or selling securitized assets from other intermediaries, selling cash flows against their
own t = 0 investments that have not yet been realized, or holding cash. When σ = h, all in-
termediaries are identical as all t = 0 investments succeed and are realized early. As a result,
there is no motive for trade, and each intermediary makes I1,h,j new investments and holds
y1,h,j in cash. When, σ = l, early intermediaries have more funds available for investment,
and thus intermediaries with late returns may have access to relatively profitable investment
14Ignoring the role of SPVs is not vital since these are typically artificial constructs, operating according
to a set of pre-specified rules. A detailed discussion of the process can be found in Gorton and Metrick
(2012).
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opportunities that cannot be exploited. We denote early types by e and late (not early)
types by ne. Early intermediaries invest an amount I1,e,j, while late intermediaries invest
I1,ne,j. Funds may be transferred between intermediaries through the exchange of securitized
assets or via the sale of remaining cash-flows on t = 0 investment. Importantly, we assume
that intermediaries have no other means to generate funds from outsiders. In particular, we
rule out lending across intermediaries at t = 1. This is done for ease of exposition, but could
be included in the analysis below without altering the qualitative results as long as there is
a limit on lending between intermediaries, which can be motivated in the same way as the
securitization frictions.
We denote early intermediaries’ period 1 purchases of securitized assets by T1,e,j. Late
intermediaries’ sales of securitized assets are −T1,ne,j, while sales of remaining cash-flows on
t = 0 assets are S1,ne,j. Cash holdings of early and late intermediaries are denoted y1,e,j
and y1,ne,j respectively. Formally, intermediary j chooses I0,j, S0,j, T0,j, Dj, y0,j, I1,h,j, I1,e,j,
I1,ne,j, T1,e,j, T1,ne,j, S1,ne,j, y1,h,j, y1,e,j, and y1,ne,j to maximize profits Πj at end of t = 2:
Πj = pΠh,j + (1− p) [lΠe,j + (1− l)Πne,j]− c(I0,j)− ρDj, (2)
where
Πh,j = qhR1I1,h,j + y1,h,j,
Πe,j = qlR1I1,e,j − c(I1,e,j) + y1,e,j + ql(pi(b)− l)R0((1− l)T0,j + T1,e,j),
Πne,j = qlR1I1,ne,j − c(I1,ne,j) + y1,ne,j + ql(pi(b)− l)R0(I0,j − S0,j + (1− l)T0,j + T1,ne,j − S1,ne,j)).
The first term in (2), Πh,j, is expected profit at period 2 following a high signal at t = 1.
In this case, all t = 0 projects succeed early and the proceeds are either re-invested in new
opportunities, with gross returns qhR1I1,h,j, or held as reserves, y1,h,j. We assume that are
there no additional costs associated with making new investments. Also, as intermediaries
are identical in this case, and each has sufficient funds to repay investors, there is no motive
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for trade. The second term in (2) is expected profit at period 2 following a low signal at
t = 1. Expected profits are a weighted sum of early and late types’ profits, Πe,j and Πne,j
respectively. Profits for early types consist of returns on new investment, qlR1I1,e,j−c(I1,e,j),
reserves carried into period 2, y1,e,j, and late returns on securitized assets purchased either
at t = 0 or t = 1, ql(pi(b)− l)R0((1− l)T0,j + T1,e,j). Similarly, profits for late types consists
of investment returns, qlR1I1,ne,j − c(I1,ne,j), reserves y1,ne,j, and late returns on assets not
sold, ql(pi(b)− l)R0(I0,j − S0,j + (1− l)T0,j + T1,ne,j − S1,ne,j)). Finally, the last two terms in
(2) capture the costs of investment in the initial period, c(I0,j), and debt repayment, ρDj.
Intermediaries maximize (2) subject to the following set of constraints:
(λ0,j) I0,j + p0(T0,j − S0,j) + y0,j ≤ wint +Dj, (3)
(µ0,j) S0,j ≤ (1− a)I0,j, (4)
(λ1,h,j) I1,h,j + y1,h,j ≤ R0(I0,j + T0,j − S0,j) + y0,j, (5)
(λ1,e,j) I1,e,j + p1T1,e,j + y1,e,j ≤ R0(I0,j − S0,j) + lR0T0,j + y0,j, (6)
(λ1,ne,j) I1,ne,j + p1(T1,ne,j − S1,ne,j) + y1,ne,j ≤ lR0T0,j + y0,j, (7)
(µ1,S,j) S0,j + S1,ne,j ≤ (1− a)I0,j, (8)
(µ1,T,j) 0 ≤ T1,ne,j + (1− l)T0,j, (9)
(η1,h,j) ρDj ≤ y1,h,j, (10)
(η1,e,j) ρDj ≤ y1,e,j, (11)
(η1,ne,j) ρDj ≤ y1,ne,j. (12)
Inequality (3) is the budget constraint at t = 0, which requires investment costs, net pur-
chases and reserves be no greater than equity and debt. The second constraint is the skin-
in-the-game requirement. Expression (5) is the budget constraint when σ = h. Inequalities
(6) and (7) are the budget constraints of the early and late intermediaries at t = 1 when
the low signal is realized. Early intermediaries have R0(I0,j − S0,j) more funds than late
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types, as their projects succeed early. Early intermediaries can then use the returns from
their individual investments along with securitized assets to purchase assets from late ones
or invest in new opportunities and reserves. Late intermediaries use returns from securitized
assets, plus funds raised from asset sales, to finance new investment and reserves. Con-
straints (8) and (9) ensure that individual and securitized asset sales are feasible and satisfy
the skin-in-the-game requirement (T1,ne,j < 0 represent sales). The final set of constraints are
the intermediaries’ collateral constraints that ensure debt is always repaid.15 The solution
to this problem is characterized in Appendix A, where the Lagrange multipliers associated
with each constraint are given in brackets above.
2.2 Investors
We assume there is a measure one of identical (infinitely) risk-averse investors, each
endowed with a large positive wealth wi. Investors value consumption only at t = 0 and
t = 2 with preferences given by
Ui = C0,i + βEω
[
min
ω
{C2,ω,i}
]
, (13)
where C0,i is consumption at t = 0, C2,ω,i is consumption at t = 2 in state ω, and β ∈ (0, 1) is
a discount factor. While these preferences are extreme, there is evidence that many investors
in securitized products, such as mutual/pension funds, require a high degree of safety.16 At
t = 0, investors can either consume their wealth, purchase risk-less debt from intermediaries
that pays a gross interest rate ρ at t = 2, or buy risky assets issued by intermediaries. At
t = 1, investors can additionally purchase securities issued by intermediaries. Investor i’s
15We assume that intermediaries and investors can commit to long term contracts. Relaxing this as-
sumption in our environment has no effect on our results, however this represents an potentially interesting
extension in a model with more general investor preferences. For example, we could interpret our contracts
as short-term, which may be rolled over at t = 1. This is done in Stein (2012), although he ignores the
potential for renegotiation at time 1.
16For example, see Bernanke, Bertaut, Demarco, and Kamin (2011), Stein (2012), and Gennaioli et al.
(2013) for a discussion on the desire for safety on the part of institutional investors.
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budget constraints at t = 0, 1, 2 are thus
C0,i +Di + p0T0,i + y0,i ≤ wi, (14)
p1T1,i + y1,i ≤ y0,i + lR0T0,i, (15)
C2,ω,i ≤ y1,i + ρDi + (1− l)ωR0T0,i + (pi(ω)− l)R0T1,i, (16)
where Di is the amount of risk-less debt purchased, y0,i and y1,i are the amounts of cash held
at t = 0, 1, and T0,i and T1,i are the quantities of intermediary assets purchased at t = 0, 1.
t=0 t=1 t=2
p
1-p
1
q
1-q
g - "Good State"
b - "Bad State"
r - "Recession State"
Each FI j chooses: 
I0,j, S0,j, T0,j, y0,j, Dj
Signal is l (low),
only a fraction l
of assets pay
out early:
Early FIs choose: 
I1,e,j, T1,e,j, y1,e,j, 
Investor i chooses: 
C0,i, T0,i, Di, y0,i
Late FIs choose: 
I1,ne,j, S1,ne,j, 
T1,ne,j, y1,ne,j
 
Signal is h (high), 
all assets pay
out early:
All FIs choose 
I1,h,j, y1,h,j 
Aggregate state, and 
payoffs on all late
assets and the t=1
investments are 
realized.
Debt is repaid,
investors consume, 
intermediary profits
are determined.
 
Figure 1: Timing.
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2.3 Equilibrium Definition
The intermediary problem is to choose investment, reserves, trade and debt levels to
maximize expected profits subject to budget, collateral, sales, and investors’ participation
constraints. The investor problem is to choose how much debt and securities issued by
intermediaries to purchase (if any), and savings to maximize expected utility of consumption
subject to budget constraints. The price of debt, ρ, and the prices of securities p0, p1, are
taken as given by intermediaries and investors. Our concept of equilibrium is characterized
in the following definition.
DEFINITION 1. A symmetric competitive equilibrium consists of prices ρ, p0, p1, and
choices of investment I0,j, I1,h,j, I1,e,j, I1,ne,j, reserves y0,j, y1,h,y1,e, y1,ne, trade T0,j, S0,j,
T1,ne, S1,ne, and debt Dj by each intermediary j, and choices of debt Di, securities purchases
T0,i, T1,i, and savings y0,i, y1,i for each investor i, such that given prices:
1. Investors maximize expected utility (13) s.t. (14)-(16),
2. Intermediaries maximize expected profits (2) s.t. (3)-(12),
3. Markets clear:
Market for debt at t = 0 :
∫
Didi =
∫
Djdj, (17)
Market for assets at t = 0 :
∫
T0,jdj +
∫
T0,idi =
∫
S0,jdj, (18)
Market for assets at t = 1 :
∫
{e}
T1,e,jdj +
∫
T1,idi =
∫
{ne}
S1,ne,jdj, (19)
where {e} and {ne} are the set of early and late types.
3 Equilibrium
In this section we characterize the competitive market equilibrium. We first solve for the
optimal decisions of investors and intermediaries given asset prices and the interest rate on
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debt. We then show how market clearing determines equilibrium prices by aggregating these
decisions.
3.1 Optimal Decisions of Investors
Investor behavior is straightforward in that they either consume their endowments, or
purchase risk-less debt. Throughout the remainder of the paper, we denote equilibrium
values with an asterisk.
LEMMA 1. T ∗0,i = y
∗
0,i = T
∗
1,i = y
∗
1,i = 0 and Di =

0, if ρ < β−1
[0, wi], if ρ = β
−1
wi, if ρ > β
−1.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Investors only value assets at the lowest realization and thus are priced out of the market for
assets by intermediaries. Moreover, investor preferences ensure that all debt is risk-free and
hence their break-even condition on funds lent to intermediaries, ρ ≥ β−1, places a lower
bound on the equilibrium interest rate.
3.2 Optimal Decisions of Intermediaries
The following assumption ensures that intermediaries borrow a positive amount, so that
taking on debt to expand investment is worthwhile.
ASSUMPTION 3. Eω (pi(ω))R0 − c′(wint) > β−1 > Eω (pi(ω))R0 − c′(wint + wi).
This assumption implies that the marginal return on investment using borrowed funds is
eventually negative despite the investments having positive NPV due to Assumption 1. This
is illustrated in Figure 2. The implications of this are characterized formally in Lemma 2,
which states that they hold no reserves at t = 0, and hold exactly the quantity of reserves
at t = 1 as needed to service debt at t = 2.
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0
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Figure 2: Illustration of Assumption 3.
LEMMA 2. Demand for debt is downward sloping, ∂D∗j/∂ρ < 0, Dj > 0 only if ρ ≤
Eω (pi(ω))R0 − c′(wint), y∗0,j = 0, y∗1,h,j = y∗1,e,j = y∗1,ne,j = ρD∗j .
Proof. See Appendix B.
Demand for debt is downward sloping due to the diminishing returns on investment at t = 0.
Given that intermediaries have a strictly positive amount of equity, a sufficiently small level
of debt can always be repaid so that Dj > 0 in equilibrium. This requires the interest rate be
below the marginal return on the first unit of debt, or Eω (pi(ω))R0−c′(wint). Moreover, it is
never optimal for intermediaries to finance reserve holdings at t = 0 via debt. This is because
for every unit of debt raised at t = 0, intermediaries must generate ρ− 1 ≥ β−1 − 1 > 0 at
t = 1 to service this additional unit of debt. To understand reserve holdings at period 1, note
that neither returns from new investments at t = 1 nor late returns on t = 0 can be pledged
to repay investors at t = 2. This is because infinitely risk-averse investors value these pledges
at the lowest possible return which is zero. Hence, intermediaries hold reserves equal to ρDj
for all σ ∈ Σ. Note that intermediaries always have sufficient funds to build up the required
reserves, otherwise no funds would be lent in equilibrium given investor preferences.
We now focus on the optimal investment and trading decisions of intermediaries at period
1, taking as given period 0 decisions. When σ = h, intermediaries are identical at t = 1 as
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all t = 0 investments succeed early, and hence there is no trade. In this case, intermediaries
simply set aside the required reserves and invest the remainder in new opportunities since
these are always worthwhile, from Assumption 2. Hence, I1,h,j = R0I0,j − ρDj. When σ = l,
intermediaries differ at period 1. A fraction l receive the full return on the fraction of t = 0
investments that were not securitized. The remaining fraction (1 − l) do not receive any
early returns on their own investments. Due to securitization, all intermediaries also receive
a fraction of the early returns from other intermediaries’ projects. For a given p1, early
types can use their funds to either invest in new opportunities or purchase assets from late
types. The amount of new investment, I1,e,j, equates the marginal return to investment with
the marginal return on purchasing assets. The former is simply qlR1 − c′(I1,e,j) while the
latter is ql(pi(b)− l)R0/p1 where ql(pi(b)− l)R0 is the net present value on t = 0 investments,
conditional on the low signal at t = 1.
LEMMA 3. Demand for assets is downward sloping, ∂T1,e,j/∂p1 < 0. Let p1 = (pi(b) −
l)R0/R1, early types t = 1 investment and asset purchases, I1,e,j and T1,e,j, are given by the
following.
For p1 < p1: I1,e,j = 0
T1,e,j =
aR0I0,j + lR0T0,j − ρDj
p1
.
For p1 ≥ p1: qlR1 − c′(I1,e,j) = ql(pi(b)− l)R0
p1
⇒ ∂I1,e,j
∂p1
> 0,
T1,e,j =
aR0I0,j + lR0T0,j − ρDj − I1,e,j
p1
.
Proof. See Appendix B.
As the price p1 increases, the return on purchasing assets is lower and therefore more invest-
ment is undertaken and fewer assets are purchased by early types. Analogously, for lower
values of p1, early types purchase more assets, and invest less.
The investment and sales decisions by late types involve a similar trade-off. By selling
17
t = 0 assets late types forgo the returns, but can increase new investment and/or generate
reserves required to service debt. Sales consist of securitized assets on hand, −T1,ne,j as well
as any of their own investments which were not sold at t = 0, S1,ne. Late types may be
constrained if they run out of t = 0 assets to sell, in which case the multiplier on the sales
constraint will bind, i.e., µ1,T,j > 0.
LEMMA 4. Let p1 = (pi(b) − l)R0/R1, late types t = 1 investment and asset purchases,
I1,ne,j, and S1,ne,j − T1,ne,j are characterized as follows.
For p1 < p1 : I1,ne,j = 0
S1,ne,j − T1,ne,j = ρDj − lR0T0,j − y0,j
p1
For p1 ≥ p1 : qlR1 − c′(I1,ne,j) = ql(pi(b)− l)R0
p1
+
µ1,T,j
(1− p)(1− l) ,
S1,ne,j − T1,ne,j = min
[
I1,ne,j + ρDj − lR0T0,j
p1
, (1− l)T0,j + (1− a)I0,j − S0,j
]
.
Proof. See Appendix B.
As can be seen from Lemmas 3 and 4, if µ1,T,j > 0, equilibrium investment levels will differ
across types at t = 1. As a result, when late types are constrained at t = 1, intermediaries
always find it optimal to securitize as much as possible at t = 0. This is formalized in the
following result.
LEMMA 5. µ1,T,j > 0 ⇐⇒ I∗1,e,j > I∗1,ne,j ⇐⇒ µ0,j > 0 and µ1,S,j = 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The key friction built in to our framework is that late intermediaries may only trade assets
at t = 1 to generate funds for investment. If late intermediaries cannot raise sufficient
funds, I∗1,e,j > I
∗
1,ne,j. Furthermore, when µ1,T,j > 0, securitized assets are worth more than
individual investment holdings, since they provide relatively more resources to late types
who value them more. As result, being constrained at t = 1 means that intermediaries
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will securitize to the extent possible at t = 0, so that µ0,j > 0. For simplicity, we shall
assume throughout that intermediaries always securitize t = 0 assets to the extent possible,
regardless of the value of µ1,T,j. Hence, S
∗
0,j = T
∗
0,j = (1 − a)I∗0,j.17 We now consider the
investment decision at period 0.
LEMMA 6. I0,j is characterized by
Eω(pi(ω))R0 − ρ+ p(R0 − ρ)(qhR1 − 1) + (1− p)l((a+ (1− a)l)R0 − ρ)(qlR1 − 1− c′(I1,e))
+ (1− p)(1− l)((1− a)lR0 − ρ)(qlR1 − 1− c′(I1,ne)) + µ1,T,j(1− a)(1− l) = c′(I0,j). (20)
Proof. See Appendix B.
The marginal return to a unit of investment at t = 0, given that D∗j > 0 is Eω(pi(ω))R0 − ρ
plus the marginal returns from re-investing early returns at t = 1. When the signal is high,
each additional unit of I0,j generates R0−ρ units of resources at t = 1 that can be reinvested
for a gross expected return qhR1. Similarly, when the signal is low, another unit of I0,j
generates (a+ (1− a)l)R0− ρ units of resources for the early types and (1− a)lR0− ρ units
of resources for the late types. These can be reinvested at gross returns of qlR1− c′(I1,e) and
qlR1 − c′(I1,ne). If the sales constraint binds, increasing I0,j provides an additional benefit:
it raises by (1− a)(1− l) units the quantity of assets late types can sell (although this can
increase total liabilities). The optimal choice of I0,j then equates the marginal benefit of
investment with the corresponding marginal cost, c′(I0,j).18
17Lemma 5 shows that this is consistent with optimal behavior when constrained. However, this is some-
what arbitrary for the unconstrained case, since the optimal choices of S0,j and T0,j are not well defined.
This is not significant for our results however, since our focus is on equilibria in which intermediaries are
constrained (the reasons for which are made clear in Section 4).
18If intermediaries incur losses at t = 1, these will be borne by their equity. As a result, this may place
an upper bound on the level of initial investment. However, we assume that the marginal costs associated
with investment at t = 0 are sufficiently high so that (20) always holds (otherwise there is no investment at
t = 1). A sufficient condition for an interior solution for I0,j is
p(R0 − ρ)(qhR1 − 1) + (1− p)(lR0 − ρ)(qlR1 − 1) + Eω (pi(ω))R0 − ρ < c′
( −ρwint
lR0 − β−1
)
.
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3.3 Market Clearing
From the optimal choices of investors and intermediaries, we can infer that ρ must satisfy
the following bounds Eω (pi(ω))R0− c′(wint) ≥ ρ ≥ β−1. In fact, given that demand for debt
is downward sloping (Lemma 1), and supply is perfectly elastic at a price of β−1 (Lemma
2), together with Assumption 3 requires that in equilibrium ρ = β−1. This is illustrated this
graphically in Figure 3.
Supply of AssetsDemand for Assets
w
Dj
i
β
D i
E (π(𝛚))R
-1
𝛚 0
q
ρ
Figure 3: Market for debt.
Consider the t = 0 market for securitized assets. It is shown in Lemma 5 that when
constrained, S0,j = T0,j = (1 − a)I0,j. When unconstrained, intermediaries are indifferent
over their choices of T0,j and S0,j, so we simply assume they securitize all assets. Regardless
of the choices of T0,j and S0,j, any candidate equilibrium price p˜0 must clear the market, and
thus S0,j(p˜0)−T0,j(p˜0) = 0. Inspecting the intermediaries’ problem, it is clear that p˜0 has no
effect on the budget, since all agents are identical and net purchases are zero. Thus optimal
choices are determined by the first order conditions from the intermediaries’ problem at a
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given p1, which are provided in Appendix A. The t = 0 price that clears the market satisfies
p0 =
aµ0,j + c
′ (I∗0,j)
λ0,j
+ 1. (21)
In an unconstrained equilibrium, p0 = c
′ (I∗0,j) /λ0,j + 1 is simply the marginal cost of time
0 investment. When constrained, p0 is strictly larger than the unconstrained case, which
reflects the fact that securitized assets are relatively valuable in this type of equilibrium as
they provide more resources to late types in the low state of the world.
We now consider the determination of p1. Investment and securitization at t = 0 influence
p1 and late types may or may not constrained, illustrated in Figures 4 and 5. From the
optimal choices of intermediaries described in Lemmas 3 and 4, we can infer the following
bounds on p1: ql(pi(b)− l)R0 ≥ p1 ≥ ql(pi(b)− l)R0/qlR1 when t = 1 investment is positive.
To understand these bounds, note that if p1 were to exceed the conditional return on assets,
early types would not be willing to purchase them, since they can always invest in new
projects that earn positive profit. Thus, at the equilibrium, assets will only trade at fire-sale
prices (i.e. below NPV). Similarly, if p1 is below ql(pi(b)− l)R0/qlR1, early types do not make
any new investments as buying up cheap assets is more profitable. The following proposition
ensures the existence of a unique equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 1. There exists a unique symmetric competitive equilibrium with positive
investment at both periods.
Proof. See Appendix B.
To more fully characterize the nature of the equilibrium we need to further characterize
the supply curve at t = 1, which depends on the relative strength of the two motives
for selling; namely to generate collateral and fund new investment. When the collateral
motive dominates, the supply curve is downward sloping. When the investment motive
is sufficiently strong, the supply curve is upward sloping, which is only possible for prices
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1
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Figure 4: Unconstrained equilibrium.
above (pi(b)− l)R0/R1. Sufficient conditions for this case to obtain are given in the following
assumption.
ASSUMPTION 4.
I. c
′′′
> 0, and c′′(wi(lR0 − β−1) + wintlR0) ≥ 1ql(pi(b)−l)R0(1−a)(wi+wint) , or
II. c
′′′
< 0 and 1
c′′(0) ≥ ql(pi(b)− l)R0(1− a)(1− l)(w + wint).
COROLLARY 1.1. Given Assumption 4, if ql(pi(b) − l) ≤ al(1−a)(1−l) , then a unique con-
strained equilibrium exists where µ1,T,j > 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
We focus below on equilibria in which µ1,T,j > 0. Assumption 4 ensures that the supply
curve at t = 1 is upward sloping, which is required for constrained equilibria. Corollary 1.1
shows that parameters exist which support this type of situation. The sufficient condition
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Figure 5: Constrained equilibrium.
in Corollary 1.1 suggests that constrained equilibria arise when a and l are relatively large
and/or the returns on t = 0 assets, conditional on σ = l, are small. Respectively, this means
there is more heterogeneity at t = 1, more cash in the market (demand) and the conditional
value of the assets is smaller so that, ceteris paribus, more assets need to be sold to generate
cash.
4 Welfare
In this section, we focus on the efficiency of allocations at the competitive equilibrium. We
begin by characterizing the first-best allocation and then consider the welfare implications
of market incompleteness and securitization for competitive equilibria.
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4.1 First-Best
In the market equilibrium, investor i’s utility is simply wi, since ρ = 1/β. It is sufficient
for our purposes to focus on the point of the first-best frontier associated with this level of
investor utility. Thus, we consider a social planner that collectively maximizes intermediary
returns, subject to ρ = 1/β. Decisions are made ex-ante and all intermediaries are equivalent
from a welfare perspective, thus we ignore subscripts and allow the planner to directly choose
the aggregate quantities I0, D, y0, I1,h, I1,e, I1,ne, y1,h, y1,l to maximize:
ΠP = p [qhR1I1,h + y1,h] + (1− p) [l(qlR1I1,e − c(I1,e))
+(1− l)(qlR1I1,ne − c(I1,ne)) + y1,l]− c(I0)− ρD, (22)
subject to the following budget and collateral constraints:
(λ0) I0 + y0 ≤ wint +D, (23)
(λ1,h) I1,h + y1,h ≤ R0I0 + y0, (24)
(λ1,l) lI1,e + (1− l)I1,ne + y1,l,≤ lR0I0 + y0, (25)
(η1,h) ρD ≤ y1,h, (26)
(η1,l) ρD ≤ y1,l. (27)
We refer to the solution of this problem as the first-best. The planner maximizes all interme-
diary profits simultaneously, subject to a single budget constraint in each state. As shown
in proof of Proposition 2, the first-best requires equal investments for early and late inter-
mediary types at t = 1, which is not necessarily the case in the private market equilibrium.
When markets are incomplete, this can result in an inefficiency that does not occur when
markets are complete, as outlined in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 2. When intermediaries have access at t = 0 to a complete set of one-
period securities that are contingent on the signal, as well as individual type at t = 1, the
24
competitive equilibrium allocation is first-best.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Securitized assets are unnecessary when intermediaries can trade one-period contingent
securities at time 0. When markets are not complete, i.e., individual type is not contractible,
trading in securitized assets at t = 0 may be useful since this can move resources at t = 1
from intermediaries whose assets have paid out to those whose have not. This is especially
valuable when intermediaries face binding constraints at time 1, since those whose assets
have not paid out at t = 1 place higher value on cash. The following result shows that when
there are no frictions in the process, securitization completes markets in this environment.
PROPOSITION 3. When there are no contingent securities at t = 0, but securitization is
frictionless, so that a = 0, the private market equilibrium allocation is first-best.
Proof. See Appendix B.
When there are no frictions in the securitization process, contingent securities are not
necessary to achieve the first-best. This is because intermediaries that are constrained at
t = 1 find it worthwhile to securitize their assets at t = 0. When a = 0, this means
that the constrained equilibrium is ruled out since all assets are securitized and there is no
heterogeneity (and thus no trade) ex-post.19 It is important to stress at this point that we
rule out borrowing between intermediaries at t = 1. If there were frictionless borrowing at
t = 1, then this also delivers the first-best without the need for securitization or contingent
contracts.
19While we assume T0,j = S0,j = (1 − a)I0,j , intermediaries may not securitize all assets if they do not
anticipate being constrained, and in this case there may be differences across types at t = 1. However,
we show below that this is not inefficient since this results only in cash transfers across risk-neutral parties
and does not affect aggregate investment. Note that if intermediaries were risk-averse, they would always
securitize the full amount since this has insurance value which is irrelevant in our setting.
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4.2 Second-Best and Inefficient Investment
We now consider the case where markets are incomplete and there are frictions associated
with the securitization process. When a > 0 and there are no alternative funds available at
t = 1, late intermediaries must secure funding through asset sales on the spot market. In
this case, there is trade at t = 1 and atomistic intermediaries fail to endogeneize the price
effects of their time 0 decisions. This can result in constrained inefficiency, in the sense that
a planner can engineer Pareto improvements even when subject to the same restrictions as
the private economy, unlike the Planner described in Section 4.1.
To show that the competitive equilibrium can be constrained inefficient, consider a per-
turbation of aggregate investment dI0 =
∫
j
dI0,j, such that dI0,j is equal for all j. The effect
of this perturbation on intermediary j’s profits at the competitive equilibrium is:
dΠ∗j
dI0
= λ∗1,e,j
(
−dp
∗
1
dI0
T ∗1,e,j
)
+ λ∗1,ne,j
(
−dp
∗
1
dI0
(T ∗1,ne,j − S∗1,ne,j)
)
. (28)
The direct impacts of the change are zero at the equilibrium allocation, which satisfies the
individual first-order conditions. What remains are the price effects that arise from a change
in aggregate investment, something not considered by individual decision makers. Note that
such a perturbation generally affects both prices p0 and p1, however changes in p0 have no
impact on time 0 intermediaries at the equilibrium, since each has net securitized assets
purchases of zero. Importantly, if dΠ∗j/dI0 6= 0, the equilibrium is constrained inefficient.
To see this, consider a constrained planning problem in which the planner is forced to
make use of the same instruments as private intermediaries. Thus, the planner solves the
private intermediary problem, except that a planner considers the implications of aggregate
investment and thus endongeneizes the price effects described in (28). Therefore, (28) is
precisely the difference between the individuals’ first order condition on t = 0 investment
and second-best planner’s problem. The following proposition summarizes the inefficiency.
PROPOSITION 4. When a > 0, the competitive market equilibrium is constrained ineffi-
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cient whenever µ1,T,j > 0. Parameters exist which support either over or under investment.
• lR0 − 1β > 0 is sufficient for under-investment.
• 1
β
− lR0 > a(1− l)R0 is sufficient for over-investment.
Proof. See Appendix B.
When unconstrained, the marginal return to t = 1 investment is equalized across in-
termediaries and thus t = 0 decisions reflect the full social cost and benefit of investment.
More specifically, individual intermediaries do not internalize the impacts of I0,j on aggregate
cash in the market and thus prices, which they take as given. The price impacts of individ-
ual decisions result in inefficiency because they influence aggregate investment and do not
merely represent cash redistributions at t = 1 (which have no welfare implications). When
lR0− 1/β > 0, t = 0 investment generates additional aggregate cash in the market at t = 1,
which results in a higher asset price and welfare improvements. If lR0 − 1/β is sufficiently
negative on the other hand, this has the opposite effect and results in over-investment.
4.3 Policy and over-investment
We now consider the use of two real-world regulatory instruments that are relevant to the
inefficiency in our model. In this section we focus solely on the over-investment case. The
following corollary of Proposition 4 considers the direct impact of restricting investment.
COROLLARY 4.1. Restrictions on leverage increase welfare when the competitive equilib-
rium is characterized by over-investment.
A reduction in leverage in our framework is equivalent to a reduction in initial investment
and the result is obtained directly from Proposition 4. This increases welfare due to the
increase in p1, which effectively transfers resources from early to late types. While this is
the most direct approach, this policy requires that a regulator have the information and
power to impose such a restriction. An alternative possibility, which may be relevant for
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the reasons discussion in Section 1, is to reduce the collateral value of investment by further
tightening the skin-in-the-game constraint. In our model, this can be analyzed with the
following comparative static result.
PROPOSITION 5. In the over-investment case, welfare decreases when skin-in-the-game
requirements are tightened, dΠ∗j/da < 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Consider,
dΠ∗j
da
= −µ∗0,jI∗0,j −
dp∗1
da
[
λ∗1,e,jT
∗
1,e,j + λ
∗
1,ne,jT
∗
1,ne,j
]
. (29)
First note that this derivative is zero in the unconstrained case. This is because production
at early and late types is identical when unconstrained, and a change in a amounts to
a redistribution of cash between risk-neutral individuals in period 1. When constrained,
the first term in the expression above is the direct effect, which is always negative and
captures the fact that increasing skin-in-the-game requirements leads to lower investment
at t = 0 as it restricts the ability of intermediaries to generate collateral. The second term
is the indirect effect, which captures the change in the equilibrium price due to changes in
a through the effect on aggregate investment at t = 0. Increasing a will tend to reduce
investment at t = 0 which will reduce the severity of the fire-sales at t = 1. As a result,
the price of assets at t = 1 are pushed up. If the price effect dominates the direct effect, it
seems plausible that a regulator could achieve a Pareto improvement by tightening the skin-
in-the-game requirements (at least for some parameterizations). The proof of Proposition
5 shows that the price effect is never sufficient to offset the direct reduction in welfare
from the restriction. The reason for this is that a price increase raises collateral value and
thus investment, defeating the purpose of the policy. Thus, while securitization leads to
more investment/leverage, which is already excessive from a second-best perspective, this is
always welfare improving. The impact on the equilibrium price p1 due to an increase in a is
illustrated in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Impact on t = 1 equilibrium of tightening skin-in-the-game requirements in the
case of over-investment.
5 Conclusion
In the absence of market frictions, securitization provides valuable risk-sharing in the
financial sector when there are incomplete markets. When intermediaries are forced to
hold some of the idiosyncratic risk associated with their investments however, a pecuniary
externality can generate inefficient investment ex-ante and excessive fire-sales ex-post. Over-
investment can be reduced by simple restrictions on leverage. However, reducing leverage
indirectly by tightening skin-in-the-game is never welfare improving.
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A Intermediary Problem
Rewrite the intermediaries’ objective as follows:
Πj = p [qhR1I1,h,j + y1,h,j]+(1−p) [l(qlR1I1,e,j − c(I1,e,j) + y1,e,j) + (1− l)(qlR1I1,ne,j − c(I1,ne,j) + y1,ne,j)
+ql(pi(b)− l)R0((1− l)(I0,j − S0,j + T0,j) + lT1,e,j + (1− l)(T1,ne,j − S1,ne,j))]−c(I0,j)−ρDj.
Necessary conditions for an optimum are:
I0,j :(1− p)ql(pi(b)− l)R0(1− l) + (λ1,h,j + λ1,e,j)R0 + (µ0,j + µ1,S,j)(1− a)− λ0,j − c′(I0,j) ≤ 0
(30)
T0,j :(1− p)ql(pi(b)− l)R0(1− l) + (λ1,h,j + l(λ1,e,j + λ1,ne,j))R0 + µ1,T,j(1− l)− λ0,jp0 ≤ 0
(31)
S0,j :− (1− p)ql(pi(b)− l)R0(1− l)− (λ1,h,j + λ1,e,j)R0 − (µ0,j + µ1,S,j) + λ0,jp0 ≤ 0
(32)
Dj :− ρ+ λ0,j − ρη1,h,j − ρη1,e,j − ρη1,ne,j ≤ 0 (33)
I1,h,j :pqhR1 − λ1,h,j ≤ 0 (34)
I1,e,j :(1− p)lqlR1 − λ1,e,j − (1− p)lc′(I1,e,j) ≤ 0 (35)
T1,e,j :(1− p)lql(pi(b)− l)R0 − λ1,e,jp1 ≤ 0 (36)
I1,ne,j :(1− p)(1− l)qlR1 − λ1,ne,j − (1− p)(1− l)c′(I1,ne,j) ≤ 0 (37)
T1,ne,j :(1− p)(1− l)ql(pi(b)− l)R0 − λ1,ne,jp1 + µ1,T,j = 0 (38)
S1,ne,j :− (1− p)(1− l)ql(pi(b)− l)R0 + λ1,ne,jp1 − µ1,S,j ≤ 0 (39)
y0,j :− λ0,j + λ1,h,j + λ1,e,j + λ1,ne,j ≤ 0 (40)
y1,h,j :p− λ1,h,j + η1,h,j = 0 (41)
y1,e,j :(1− p)l − λ1,e,j + η1,e,j = 0 (42)
y1,ne,j :(1− p)(1− l)− λ1,ne,j + η1,ne,j = 0 (43)
It is straightforward to show that all budget and collateral constraints bind:
λ0,j, λ1,h,j, λ1,e,j, λ1,ne,j, η1,h,j, η1,e,j, η1,ne,j > 0.
It is shown in Lemma 5 that when constrained at t = 1, S0,j = T0,j = (1 − a)I0,j. When
unconstrained, intermediaries are indifferent over their choices of T0,j and S0,j, so as discussed
in the paper we simply assume they prefer to securitize all assets. To characterize the
solution, we impose this and recast the intermediary problem accordingly. Focusing on the
case in which µ1,T,j > 0, we use the constraints to rewrite the choice variables in terms of
I0,j, and I1,e,j.
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Choice variables given I0,j, and I1,e,j:
y0,j = 0,
Dj = I0,j − wint,
I1,h,j = R0I0,j − ρDj,
= (R0 − ρ) I0,j + ρwint,
y1,e,j = y1,ne,j = y1,h,j = ρDj,
T1,e,j =
(aR0 + (1− a)lR0)I0,j − ρDj − I1,e,j
p1
,
=
(
aR0 + (1− a)lR0 − ρ
p1
)
I0,j −
(
1
p1
)
I1,e,j +
(
1
p1
)
ρwint,
T1,ne,j = −(1− l)(1− a)I0,j,
I1,ne,j = ((1− a) (lR0 + (1− l)p1)− ρ)I0,j + ρwint,
The multipliers are determined by the first order conditions as follows:
λ1,h,j = pqhR1,
λ1,e,j = (1− p)l(qlR1 − c′(I1,e,j)) = (1− p)lql(pi(b)− l)R0
p1
,
λ1,ne,j = (1− p)(1− l)(qlR1 − c′(I1,ne,j)),
λ0,j = ρ(λ1,h,j + λ1,e,j + λ1,ne,j),
η1,h,j = λ1,h,j − p,
η1,e,j = λ1,e,j − (1− p)l,
η1,ne,j = λ1,ne,j − (1− p)(1− l),
µ0,j =
lR0 + (1− l)p1
p1
µ1,T,j,
µ1,T,j = λ1,ne,jp1 − (1− p)(1− l)ql(pi(b)− l)R0,
= p1
[
λ1,ne,j − (1− l)
l
λ1,e,j
]
.
Substituting the expressions above into the first order conditions on I0,j and I1,e,j and ma-
nipulating, we obtain the following three equations that characterize the optimal investment
(we include I1,ne,j again for convenience).
(R0 − ρ)λ1,h,j + (aR0 + (1− a)lR0 − ρ)λ1,e,j + (1− p)(1− l)(a+ (1− a)l)ql(pi(b)− l)R0
+(1− p)(1− l)(qlR1 − c′(I1,ne))((1− a) (lR0 + (1− l)p1)− ρ) = c′(I0,j), (44)
qlR1 − ql(pi(b)− l)R0
p1
= c′(I1,e,j), (45)
((1− a) (lR0 + (1− l)p1)− ρ)I0,j + ρwint = I1,ne,j. (46)
The intermediaries’ problem has a unique solution when the corresponding second-order
conditions hold. As the objective is separable in I0,j and I1,e,j, it suffices to show that
∂2pij
∂I20,j
< 0,
∂2pij
∂I21,e,j
< 0, which is true from the assumption that c′′(·) > 0.
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The t = 0, 1 market-clearing conditions written in terms of (equilibrium) investments are:
I∗1,ne,j(p0, p1) = ((lR0 + (1− l)p1)(1− a)− ρ) I∗0,j(p0, p1) + ρwint, (47)
I∗1,e,j(p0, p1) =
(
R0(l + a(1− l))− (1− l)
2
l
(1− a)p1 − ρ
)
I∗0,j(p0, p1) + ρwint. (48)
These conditions have been simplified to show that prices are such that both late and early
types invest available funds at time 1. Available funds for early (late) types is cash from
time 0 investments, net of purchases (sales) and required collateral, ρ(I∗0,j − wint).
B Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Let lR0 ≤ 1/β. At t = 0, investors value securitized assets at βpi(r)R0 = βlR0 ≤
1 < p0. If lR0 > 1/β, intermediaries can take on debt to purchase securitized assets and be
guaranteed sufficient returns at t = 1 to cover the debt at t = 2. Thus, an equilibrium p0
must be at least as large as gross returns on the time 0 asset to clear the market. Rewriting
(1), gross returns are lR0 + (1− l)R0[p+ (1− p)q(pi(b)− l)] > βlR0. Thus, investors do not
purchase securitized assets in either case.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Using Dj = I0,j − wint from the solution to the intermediaries’ problem we have
∂Dj
∂ρ
=
∂I0,j
∂ρ
= −λ1,h,j + λ1,e,j + λ1,ne,j
c′′(I0,j)
< 0, (49)
using (44) when intermediaries are unconstrained. In the constrained case, we have
∂I0,j
∂ρ
= −λ1,h,j + λ1,e,j + λ1,ne,j − (1− p)(1− l)
[
c
′′
(I1,ne,j)Dj((1− a) (lR0 + (1− l)p1)− ρ)
]
c′′(I0,j) + c
′′(I1,ne,j)(1− p)(1− l)((1− a)(lR0 + (1− l)p1)− ρ)2 ,
where we have used (46) to obtain I ′1,ne,j = ((1− a)(lR0 + (1− l)p1)− ρ)I ′0,j − (I0,j − wint).
Then,
∂I0,j
∂ρ
< 0 when
(1− a)(lR0 + (1− l)p1)− ρ < λ1,h,j + λ1,e,j + λ1,ne,j
(1− p)(1− l)c′′(I1,ne,j)(I0,j − wint) . (50)
A sufficient condition for this is:
lR0 − ρ < pqhR1 + (1− p)
(1− p)(1− l)wic′′((lR0 − r)wi + lR0wint) . (51)
In the constrained case, an increase in ρ not only reduces generally the available resources at
t = 1, it also changes the value of resources for late types. When (1− a)(l+ (1− l)ql(pi(b)−
l))R0 − ρ > 0, this value may in fact increase with ρ. When the above condition holds, it
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ensures that this increase is dominated by the general decline resources. Hence, when this
condition holds, demand for debt is always downward sloping.
To see that Dj > 0 when ρ ≤ Eω (pi(ω))R0 − c′(wint), first note that I0,j = Dj + wint.
Then, using (30), and noting that λ1,h,j = pqR1 > p, λ1,ne,j ≥ (1− p)(1− l), λ1,e,j ≥ (1− p)l,
and µ1,T,j ≥ 0, the marginal benefit of the first unit of debt is at least
p(R0 − ρ) + (1− p)l((a+ (1− a)l)R0 − ρ) + (1− p)(1− l)((1− a)lR0 − ρ)
+ (1− p)(1− l)ql(pi(b)− l)R0 − c′(wint) (52)
= Eω (pi(ω))R0 − ρ− c′(wint) ≥ 0, (53)
when ρ ≤ Eω (pi(ω))R0 − c′(wint). Thus, Dj > 0 and I0,j > wint.
To prove the second part of the Lemma, combine (33) with (41)-(43) to obtain λ0,j ≤
ρ(λ1,h,j + λ1,e,j + λ1,ne,j). Then, using this in (40), the marginal benefit to holding reserves
is (−ρ+ 1)(λ1,h,j + λ1,e,j + λ1,ne,j) < 0 as ρ ≥ β−1 > 1.
To prove the next part of the Lemma, use (34) and (41) to obtain: η1,h,j = λ1,h,j − p ≥
pqhRh − p > 0, (35) and (42) to obtain η1,e,j ≥ (1 − p)l (qlR1 − c′(I1,e,j)) > 0, and (37) and
(43) to get η1,ne,j ≥ (1 − p)(1 − l) (qlR1 − c′(I1,ne,j)) > 0, where all three strict inequalities
follow from Assumption 2.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. When p1 < p1, returns on purchasing assets strictly dominate investing, hence I1,e,j =
0, and T1,e,j =
aR0I0,j+lR0T0,j−ρDj
p1
via the budget constraint (3). When, p1 ≥ p1, combining
(35) and (36), we obtain the desired characterization for I1,e,j, and T1,e,j follows from (6).
Furthermore,
I ′1,e,j =
q(pi(b)− l)R0
c′′(I0,j)p21
> 0. (54)
Thus,
∂T1,e,j
∂p1
=
−I ′1,e,jp1 − (aR0I0,j + lR0T0,j − rDj − I1,e,j)
p1
< 0. (55)
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. The proof is analogous to Lemma 3.
Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. Equations (35) and (36) yield
c′(I1,e) = ql
(
R1 − (pi(b)− l)R0
p1
)
. (56)
Similarly, using (37) and (38) we have
c′(I1,ne) = ql
(
R1 − (pi(b)− l)R0 + µ1,T,j
p1
)
. (57)
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Hence, µ1,T,j = 0 ⇔ I1,e,j = I1,ne,j. Moreover, when µ1,T,j > 0, c′(I1,ne,j) < c′(I1,e,j) =⇒
I1,e,j > I1,ne,j as c(·) is convex. Adding (31), and (32), we obtain lR0λ1,ne,j− (1− l)R0λ1,e,j +
(1− l)µ1,T,j ≤ µ0,j +µ1,S,j. Substituting expressions for λ1,e,j, and λ1,ne,j from the first order
conditions we can simplify as follows:
µ1,T,j
(
l
R0
p1
+ (1− l)
)
= µ0,j + µ1,S,j. (58)
Since the bracketed term in (58) is strictly positive, µ1,T,j > 0 ⇔ µ0,j + µ1,S,j > 0. Finally,
to show that µ0,j > 0, and µ1,S,j = 0, we add (30), and (32), to obtain [λ0,j(p0 − 1) −
c′(I0,j)]/a = µ0,j + µ1,S,j, when investment and sales are non-negative. This implies that
p0 > 1 + c
′(I0,j)/λ0,j > 1. Hence, it is profitable to invest and then sell assets at t = 0. As a
result, µ0,j > 0, and therefore µ1,S,j = 0 since there are no assets to sell at period 1.
Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. The condition characterizing optimal I0,j is derived formally in Appendix A (see
(44)). Noting that S0,j = T0,j, the expression for D0,j follows from the period 0 budget
constraint.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. It suffices to show there is a unique p1 that clears the asset market at t = 1. We focus
on prices that satisfy p1 > p1 = ql(pi(b) − l)R0/qlR1, otherwise neither early or late types
invest at t = 1. In an equilibrium with no investment at t = 1, excess demand is
1
p1
(lR0I0,j − ρDj), (59)
where the bracketed term is aggregate resources net of debt obligations at t = 1. Thus, inter-
mediaries invest exactly that amount which allows them to satisfy their debt requirements.
This type of equilibrium will arise when investments at t = 0 are sufficiently more profitable
than those at t = 1. With no investment at t = 1 there is no inefficiency in our model and
thus we ignore these cases.
First, consider constrained equilibria at t = 1. As shown in Lemma 3, demand for assets
at t = 1 is monotone decreasing. For a given I0,j > 0, the quantity traded is (1−a)(1− l)I0,j
and the unique price is simply determined by demand as characterized in Section A. We
provide a condition on model primitives in Lemma 1.1 that is sufficient to ensure the existence
of such a (unique) constrained equilibrium.
If the equilibrium is unconstrained, excess demand at t = 1 is given by
lR0I0,j − ρDj − I1
p1
, (60)
where I1 = I1,e,j = I1,ne,j, since investments are equalized in the unconstrained case. Differ-
entiating (60) with respect to p1 gives
− I
′
1
p1
−
(
lR0I0,j − ρDj − I1
p21
)
< 0, (61)
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as I ′1 > 0 and collateral constraints require lR0I0,j − ρDj − I1 ≥ 0. Thus excess demand is
strictly decreasing in p1. Furthermore, demand exceeds supply at p1, since I1 = 0 at this
price and resources must be positive for t = 1 investment to be non-zero. To show that
excess demand is negative for some p1 < ql(pi(b) − l)R0, it suffices to show that demand
is zero at this price. From the first order conditions on investment and asset purchases at
t = 1, (35) and (36), we have
ql(pi(b)− l)R0
p1
≤ qlR1 − c′(I1,e,j). (62)
At p1 = ql(pi(b)− l)R0, this collapses to 1 ≤ qlR1 − c′(I1,e,j), which is strict by Assumption
2 and therefore demand for assets is zero. Given that excess demand is continuous, we
conclude that an equilibrium in the asset market at t = 1 exists and is unique.
Proof of Corollary 1.1
Proof. When investment is positive, at an interior
S1 =
I1,ne,j − (1− a)lR0I0,j + ρDj
p1
(63)
S ′1 =
I ′1,ne,j
p1
− I1,ne,j
p21︸ ︷︷ ︸
Investment motive
+
(1− a)lR0I0,j − ρDj
p21︸ ︷︷ ︸
Collateral Motive
=
I ′1,ne,j − S1
p1
. (64)
The collateral motive is negative when (1 − a)lR0I0,j − ρDj < 0, so that late types must
raise money to cover debt. If this effect is dominant, the supply curve is downward sloping.
We now show that supply can be upward sloping in the range where I1,ne,j > 0. It
is sufficient to show that I ′1,ne,j − S1 > 0 can be positive at S1 = (1 − a)I0,j − lT0,j =
(1− a)(1− l)I0,j, which is the maximum value of S1. Rewriting gives
ql(pi(b)− l)R0
c′′(I1,ne,j)p21
≥ (1− a)(1− l)I0,j. (65)
Using p1 < ql(pi(b)− l)R0 and I0,j < wi + wint, we have the following sufficient condition
1
c′′(wi(lR0 − ρ) + wintlR0) ≥ ql(pi(b)− l)R0(1− a)(1− l)(wi + wint), (66)
if c
′′′
(·) > 0. The following condition is sufficient if c′′′(·) < 0
1
c′′(0)
≥ ql(pi(b)− l)R0(1− a)(1− l)(w + wint). (67)
To complete the proof, we show that parameters exist such that the equilibrium may
be constrained. First, posit an unconstrained equilibrium in which excess demand is zero.
From the first order conditions we have
p1 =
ql(pi(b)− l)R0
qlR1 − c′(I1,j) , (68)
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where I1,j = I1,e,j = I1,ne,j = lR0I0,j − ρDj, since the sales constraint is slack by assumption.
Substituting this into the individuals’ supply function gives the equilibrium quantity
S1,j =
alR0I0,j(qlR1 − c′(I1,j))
ql(pi(b)− l)R0 . (69)
If S1,j > (1 − l)(1 − a)I0,j, then the equilibrium must be constrained. The time 1 asset is
assumed to be positive NPV, so that qlR1 − c′(I1,j) > 1. Using this and simplifying gives
(pi(b)− l)(1− l)
l
(1− a)
a
≤ 1
ql
. (70)
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We first outline the salient features of solution to the planning problem described
in (22)-(27). It is straightforward to show that all budget and collateral constraints bind,
that no reserves are held at t = 0 and the interior solution is unique since −c′′(I0) < 0.
Combining the first order conditions on t = 1 investment gives
(1− p)(qlR1 − c′(I1,e)) = (1− p)(qlR1 − c′(I1,e)) =⇒ I1,e = I1,ne = I1. (71)
Furthermore,
I1,h = (R0 − ρ)I0 + ρwint, (72)
I1,e = I1,ne = (lR0 − ρ)I0 + ρwint, (73)
where we have used D = I0 − wint. Investments at t = 0 and t = 1 are thus related as
follows:
(1− p)(lR0 − ρ)(qlR1 − c′(I1)) + p(R0 − ρ)(qhR1) = c′(I0). (74)
The planner equates the marginal cost of investment at t = 0 with the marginal benefit of
investment across the states at t = 1, where investments are equalized across intermediary
types in the low state.
Contingent Securities
We now introduce contingent securities traded at t = 0, conditional on individual type
at t = 1, when σ = l (there is no gains from trading securities that pay off when σ = h
since all intermediaries are identical in this state). Further, there is no motive for trade at
t = 1 and we ignore this possibility. The security pays the owner one unit, conditional on
σ = l and the realization of late returns. Denote by ζne and ζe the quantities of this security
purchased or sold, and ρ0 the corresponding price. The intermediaries’ problem is:
Πj = p[qhR1I1,h,j + y1,h,j] + (1− p)l[qlR1I1,e,j − c(I1,e,j) + y1,e,j]
+ (1− p)(1− l)[qlR1I1,ne,j − c(I1,ne,j) + y1,ne,j]− c(I0,j)− ρDj, (75)
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subject to:
(λ0,j) I0,j + ρ0(ζne,j − ζe,j) + y0,j ≤ wint +Dj, (76)
(λ1,h,j) I1,h,j + y1,h,j ≤ R0I0,j + y0,j, (77)
(λ1,e,j) I1,e,j + y1,e,j ≤ R0I0,j − (1− l)ζe.j + y0,j, (78)
(λ1,ne,j) I1,ne,j + y1,ne,j ≤ −lζne,j + y0,j, (79)
(η1,h,j) ρDj ≤ y1,h,j, (80)
(η1,e,j) ρDj ≤ y1,e,j, (81)
(η1,ne,j) ρDj ≤ y1,ne,j. (82)
All budget constraints bind, y0,j = 0, and all collateral constraints will bind, so that y1,h,j =
y1,e,j = y1,ne,j = ρDj. We can then rewrite the objective and obtain the following necessary
optimality conditions:
I0,j :pqhR1(R0 − ρ) + λ1,e,j(R0 − ρ) + λ1,ne,j(−ρ) = 0, (83)
I1,e,j :(1− p)l [qlR1 − c′(I1,e,j)] = λ1,e,j, (84)
I1,ne,j :(1− p)(1− l) [qlR1 − c′(I1,ne,j)] = λ1,ne,j, (85)
ζne.j :pqhR1(−ρp0) + λ1,e,j(−ρp0) + λ1,ne,j(l − ρp0) = 0, (86)
ζe.j :pqhR1(ρp0) + λ1,e,j(ρp0 − (1− l)) + λ1,ne,j(ρp0) = 0. (87)
Using (86) and (87), we obtain λ1,e,j/l = λ1,ne,j/(1− l), which substituted into the first order
conditions for t = 1 investment yield I1,e,j = I1,ne,j = I1,j. Thus, trading securities at t = 0
permits agents to equate the marginal returns to investment at t = 1. Write the foc for I0,j
as follows:
pqhR1(R0 − ρ) + (1− p) [qlR1 − c′(I1,j)] (lR0 − ρ) = c′(I0,j). (88)
This is identical to (74), hence the market allocation when Arrow securities are traded is
Pareto efficient.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. When a = 0 intermediaries are never constrained at t = 1. Suppose they are con-
strained, then by Lemma 5, they are constrained at t = 0. As a = 0, this implies that
S0,j = I0,j, but then at t = 1 early and late intermediaries have the same resources. Thus,
there is no motive for trade at t = 1, and therefore no asset sales and hence intermediaries
are never constrained. Clearly, this implies that I1,e,j = I1,ne,j = I1.
The necessary conditions for an optimum to the intermediaries’ problem can be reduced
to the following:
I0,j :(1− p)ql(pi(b)− l)R0(1− l)− c′(I0,j) + [λ1,h,j + λ1,e,j + λ1,ne,j] (R0 − ρ) = 0, (89)
I1,e,j :(1− p)lqlR1 − λ1,e,j − (1− p)lc′(I1) = 0, (90)
I1,ne,j :(1− p)(1− l)qlR1 − λ1,ne,j − (1− p)(1− l)c′(I1) = 0. (91)
Substituting (90) and (91) into (89), we obtain (74) from the solution to the Planner’s
problem.
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Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Differentiating the Lagrangian for the intermediaries’ problem we have:
dΠ∗j
dI0
=
dp∗1
dI0
[
µ∗1,T,j
p∗1
(1− l)(1− a)I∗0
]
, (92)
where we use the market clearing condition lT ∗1,e,j = −(1− l)T ∗1,ne,j. Since the price effect in
(92) is non-zero, the equilibrium is inefficient whenever µ∗1,T,j > 0.
To characterize the nature of the inefficiency, note that from (92), sign(dΠ∗j/dI0) =
sign(dp∗1/dI0). Multiplying the market clearing condition at t = 1 by p
∗
1 and noting that
T ∗1,ne,j = −(1 − l)T ∗0,j = −(1 − l)(1 − a)I∗0,j due to the binding sales constraint implies that
p1lT
∗
1,e = p1(1− l)2(1− a)I∗0,j. Differentiating with respect to I0, and noting that S∗0,j = T ∗0,j
gives:
dp∗1
dI0
=
l ((l + a(1− l))R0 − 1/β)− (1− l)2(1− a)p∗1
l
dI∗1,e
dp1
+ (1− l)2(1− a)I∗0
. (93)
The denominator is strictly positive since
dI∗1,e
dp1
= ql(pi(b)−l)R0
c′′(I∗1,e,j)p
∗2
1
> 0 as c′′ > 0. Thus, the sign of
dp∗1/dI0 is determined solely by the numerator. First, we characterize parameters to support
the under-investment case. Under-investment occurs when
p∗1 <
l ((l + a(1− l))R0 − 1/β)
(1− l)2(1− a) . (94)
From Lemma 5, we know that I∗1,ne,j < I
∗
1,e,j when late sellers are constrained. Using (47)
and (48), we have the following upper bound on the price in a constrained equilibrium:
p∗1 < pc =
alR0
(1− a)(1− l) . (95)
Therefore, a sufficient condition for (94) is
alR0
(1− l)(1− a) <
l ((l + a(1− l))R0 − 1/β)
(1− l)2(1− a) ⇐⇒ lR0 > 1/β, (96)
which is the expression in Proposition 4.
Over-investment occurs when the inequality in (94) is reversed. Positive investment at
t = 1 requires p∗1 ≥ p1 = (pi(b)− l)R0/R1, and thus a sufficient condition for over-investment
is
(pi(b)− l)R0
R1
>
l ((l + a(1− l))R0 − 1/β)
(1− l)2(1− a) . (97)
Manipulating gives
R0
R1
(pi(b)− l)(1− l)
l
(1− a)
a
>
lR0 − 1/β + a(1− l)R0
a(1− l) . (98)
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Assume that
(pi(b)− l)(1− l)
l
(1− a)
a
=
1
ql
, (99)
which from (70), ensures a constrained equilibrium. Substituting (99) into (98) we have
1/β − lR0 > a(1− l)R0
(
1− 1
qlR1
)
. (100)
Since 1− 1/qlR1 < 1, the condition in Proposition 4 follows.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof.
dΠ∗j
da
=
µ∗1,T,jI
∗
0,j
p∗1
[
(1− a)(1− l)dp
∗
1
da
− lR0 − (1− l)p∗1
]
, (101)
where we have used (58), and T ∗0,j = S
∗
0,j = (1 − a)I∗0,j. We ignore the price effects arising
from changes in p∗0, since changes to p
∗
0 have no welfare implications at the equilibrium. This
is because all intermediaries have net zero sales at t = 0, thus changes in p∗0 do not alter the
budget and thus do not affect investment.
The t = 1 market-clearing condition, lT ∗1,e = (1− l)T ∗1,ne can be expressed as:
l
((a+ (1− a)l)R0 − 1/β) I∗0,j + wint/β − I∗1,e,j
p∗1
= (1− l)2(1− a)I∗0,j. (102)
Differentiating both sides with respect to a and solving for
dp∗1
da
we have:
dp∗1
da
=
lR0 + (1− l)p∗1
(1− l)(1− a) ·
(1− l)(1− a)
(
(1− l)I∗0,j − MlR0+(1−l)p∗1
∂I∗0,j
∂a
)
M
∂I∗0,j
∂p1
+ lql(pi(b)−l)R0
p∗21 c
′′ (I∗1,e,j)
+ (1− l)2(1− a)I∗0,j
 , (103)
where we have used
dI∗1,e,j
da
= ql(pi(b)−l)R0
p∗21 c
′′ (I∗1,e,j)
dp∗1
da
, and
∂I∗0,j
∂a
=
(lR0 + (1− l)p1)(1− p)(1− l)
(
c′ne − c′e + c′′neMneI∗0,j
)
(1− p)(1− l)c′′neM2ne + c′′0
, (104)
∂I∗0,j
∂p1
=
−Me(1−p)lql(pi(b)−l)R0
p21
+ (1− p)(1− l)2(1− a)(qlR1 − c′ne − c′′neMneI∗0,j)
(1− p)(1− l)c′′neM2ne + c′′0
,
=
µ1,T,j(1−a)(1−l)
p1
+
Mλ1,ne,j
lp1
− c′′neMneI∗0,j
(1− p)(1− l)c′′neM2ne + c′′0
, (105)
M = (1− l)2(1− a)p1 − l((a+ (1− a)l)R0 − β−1), (106)
Me = aR0 + (1− a)lR0 − β−1, (107)
Mne = (1− a) (lR0 + (1− l)p1)− β−1. (108)
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Then,
dΠ∗j
da
> 0 when the following is true
dp∗1
da
>
lR0 + (1− l)p∗1
(1− a)(1− l) ⇐⇒ Ω ≡
(1− l)(1− a)
(
(1− l)I∗0,j − MlR0+(1−l)p∗1
∂I∗0,j
∂a
)
M
∂I∗0,j
∂p1
+ lql(pi(b)−l)R0
p∗21 c
′′ (I∗1,e,j)
+ (1− l)2(1− a)I∗0,j
 > 1.
(109)
Using qlR1 − ql(pi(b)−l)R0p∗1 = c
′(I∗1,e,j) from the first order conditions, rewrite Ω as
Ω =

+ φ
, (110)
where
 = (1− l)2(1− a)I∗0,j +
(1− p)(1− l)2(1− a)M
δ
(
c′e − c′ne − c
′′
neMneI
∗
0,j
)
, (111)
φ =
ql(pi(b)− l)R0
p∗1
(
(1− p)(1− l)2(1− a)M
δ
+
l
p∗1c
′′(I∗1,e,j)
− MMe(1− p)l
δp∗1
)
, (112)
δ = (1− p)(1− l)c′′neM2ne + c
′′
0 > 0. (113)
Manipulation gives
φ =
(1− p)ql(pi(b)− l)R0
p1δ
(
M2
p1
+
lδ
p1c
′′(I∗1,e,j)
)
> 0. (114)
M > 0 is simply the condition for over-investment, which is derived in the proof of Proposi-
tion 4. Further, Mne < 0 in the over-investment case. To see this, note that Mne is strictly
increasing in p1. Evaluate Mne at the maximum constrained price pc = alR0/(1− l)(1− a)
described in (95). This gives Mne(pc) = lR0 − β−1, which must be negative in the over-
investment case as shown in the proof of Proposition 4. Thus, both  and φ are strictly
positive and Ω < 1, implying the effect of the change is negative.
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